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Abstract
We conduct a proper test of the claim that people are overcondent, in the sense
that they believe that they are better than others. The results of the experiment we
present do not allow us to reject the hypotheses that the data has been generated by
perfectly rational, unbiased, and appropriately condent agents.
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1 Introduction
A large body of literature across several disciplines, including psychology, nance, and eco-
nomics, purports to nd that people are generally overcondent.1 For economists, the issue
This paper was previously circulated as A Proper Test of Overcondence. We thank Uriel Haran for
help with data collection as well as the sta¤ and facilities of the Center for Behavioral Decision Research at
Carnegie Mellon University.
yemail: dubraj@um.edu.uy
1Papers on overcondence in economics include Camerer and Lovallo (1999) analyzing entry in an industry,
Fang and Moscarini (2005) analyzing the e¤ect of overcondence on optimal wage setting, Garcia, Sangiorgi
and Urosevic (2007) analyzing the e¢ ciency consequences of overcondence in information acquisition in
nancial markets, K½oszegi (2006) who studies how overcondence a¤ects how people choose tasks or careers,
and Menkho¤ et al. (2006) who analyze the e¤ect of overcondence on herding by fund managers. In
nance, papers include Barber and Odean (2001), Bernardo and Welch (2001), Chuang and Lee (2006),
Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (2001), Kyle and Wang (1997), Malmendier and Tate (2005), Peng
and Xiong (2006), and Wang (2001). See Benoît and Dubra (2008) for a discussion of some of the literature.
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of overcondence is of paramount importance as it a¤ects the equilibrium outcomes in almost
every market. Although the term overcondencehas been used rather broadly, Moore and
Healy (2008) point out that, in fact, three distinct varieties of overcondence have been ex-
amined in the literature: (1) a person overestimating his or her performance or abilities, (2)
a person overplacing himself relative to others, and (3) a person having excessive condence
in the accuracy of his beliefs, or overprecision. In this paper, we focus on the second type of
overcondence, overplacement.
For the most part, researchers have not directly observed overplacement but, rather,
inferred a tendency for individuals to rank themselves too highly from a tendency for a
majority of people to claim to be superior to the median person the so-called better-than-
average e¤ect. The better-than-average-e¤ect has been noted for a wide range of simple skills,
from driving, to spoken expression, to the ability to get along with others, to test taking on
easy tests.2 While this e¤ect is well established, Benoît and Dubra (2008) (henceforth B&D)
have recently questioned its signicance. They show that better-than-average data in and of
itself merely gives the appearance that (some) people must be overplacing themselves, but
does not indicate true overplacement, which carries with it the implication that people have
made some kind of error in their self-placements.3 Because of this reason, almost none of the
existing experimental literature on the better-than-average e¤ect can actually claim to have
found overplacement.4 Moreover, most of the experiments by their very design do not even
have the potential of showing overplacement. In this paper, we report on an experiment
designed to provide a proper test of overplacement. The following example, taken directly
from B&D, illustrates the basic aw in previous tests.
Consider a large population with three types of drivers, low skilled, medium skilled, and
high skilled, and suppose that the probabilities of any one of them causing an accident in
any single period are pL = 45 ; pM =
2
5
; and pH = 0. In period 0, nature chooses a skill level
for each person with equal probability. Initially, no driver knows his or her own skill level,
and so each person (rationally) evaluates himself as no better or worse than average. In
period 1, everyone drives and learns something about his skill, based upon whether or not
he has caused an accident. Each person is then asked how his driving skill compares to the
rest of the population. How does a driver who has not caused an accident reply?
2While early research pointed towards a universal better-than-average e¤ect, more recent work indicates
that the e¤ect is primarily for easy tasks and may be reversed for di¢ cult tasks.
3Other papers which also question this stance include Zábojník (2004) and Brocas and Carillo (2007).
4We note, however, that many papers on the better-than-average e¤ect have a di¤erent goal than simply
demonstrating overplacement. For instance, Kruger (1999) tests for the relationship between the better-
than-average e¤ect and egocentrism.
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Using Bayesrule, he evaluates his own skill level as follows:
p (Low skill j No accident) =
1
3
1
5
1
3
+ 1
3
3
5
+ 1
3
1
5
=
1
9
p (Medium skill j No accident) =
1
3
3
5
1
3
+ 1
3
3
5
+ 1
3
1
5
=
1
3
p (High skill j No accident) =
1
3
1
3
+ 1
3
3
5
+ 1
3
1
5
=
5
9
Such a driver thinks there is over a 1
2
chance (in fact, 5
9
) that his skill level is in the top
third of all drivers. His mean probability of an accident is 5
9
0+ 1
3
2
5
+ 1
9
4
5
= 2
9
, which is better
than for 2
3
of the drivers, and better than the population mean. Furthermore, his beliefs
about himself strictly rst order stochastically dominate the population distribution. Any
way he looks at it, a driver who has not had an accident should evaluate himself as better
than average. Since 3
5
of drivers have not had an accident, 3
5
rationally rank themselves as
better than average.
As this example shows, the fact that 60% of drivers rank themselves above the median
does not indicate erroneous self-evaluations. In fact, Theorem 1 below shows that any frac-
tion of people could rank themselves as being in the top half of the population without any
overplacement being implied. Therefore, any experiment designed just to show that more
than half the population rank themselves as better than average cannot possibly show over-
placement. Experiments with more detailed information on how subjects place themselves
in percentiles have the potential to show overplacement, but even these must be carefully
interpreted.
We conduct a test that has the potential to reveal that people are not making rational
assessments of their abilities. The experiment is based upon the theory developed in B&D,
which we briey review in Section 2. Although the subjects in our experiment also give the
supercial appearance of being overcondent by overplacing themselves, we do not nd any
evidence that they are in fact overcondent. While this nding by itself hardly proves that
people do not overplace themselves, it does not stand alone. Two other experiments which
conduct careful, proper tests of overplacement are Clark and Friesen (2008) and Moore and
Healy (2008), and they also do not nd such a bias. Furthermore, as is argued in B&D,
the well-known experiment by Camerer and Lovallo (1999) which is usually interpreted as
showing overplacement is better interpreted as showing no overplacement.5
5In the experiment, N subjects (rms) must decide whether to play In or Out. After the entry decisions
are made, the subjects who have played In are ranked. The payo¤ to playing In is greater than the payo¤
to playing Out if and only if an entrant is ranked in the top k < N . There are two treatments, one in which
subjects are ranked randomly and one in which they are ranked according to their performance on a test.
More subjects enter under the test treatment than the random treatment, and Camerer and Lovallo conclude
3
The most common type of experiment in this eld asks subjects how they rank compared
to others. For instance, Weinstein (1980) asks students to compare themselves to the average
student on a variety of attributes, including their chances of getting a good job o¤er before
graduation and their chances of developing a drinking problem. Similarly, Svenson (1981)
asks subjects in a room to estimate how their driving compares to the other subjects, and
to make estimates of the form I drive better than x% of the people in this room.
There are at least four criticisms that can be made of this type of experiment, though
not every criticism applies to every experiment:
1. Participants have no material incentive to answer the question accurately and internal
motivations to answer accurately are likely to compete with other motivations, such as
appearing competent, self-condent, or modest.
2. It may be unclear to the subjects what is meant by an averagestudent. In particular,
should the average be interpreted as the mean or median (or something else still)?
3. Subjects may be uncertain of their own skill levels, making the meaning of their answers
unclear.
4. The research design does not allow subjects to demonstrate their degree of condence
in their self-placement.
The rst two criticisms are quite familiar, so let us turn to the last two. Consider a
subject who is asked to rank himself on IQ, given that the median IQ is 100. If he has not
actually taken an IQ test then he must guess at his IQ. Suppose, for the sake of argument,
that he believes that his IQ is 80 with probability 0.45, 110 with probability 0.45, and 115
with probability 0.1. How should he rank himself? He could reasonably respond that be
believes himself to be of above average intelligence, given that there is over a 50% chance
that his IQ is above average. On the other hand, he could just as reasonably respond that
he is of below average intelligence, given that his mean IQ is only 97. Thus, the subjects
answer to the question gives no clear indication of its meaning. By the same token, we have
no way of knowing his degree of condence when he utters a statement like I believe I
have a higher IQ than the average person. As we will discuss, both these ambiguities have
important implications. Note, however, that if, as a matter of fact, subjects have very tight
estimates of their types then both these issues become moot the various meanings they
could have for their answers converge and subjects will be almost 100% condent in their
that this indicates that the subjects are overcondent. However, as we show in B&D, increased entry does
not show overcondence. Overcondence would be indicated if subjects earned negative expected prots or
utility. However, these quantities are both positive (even for large degrees of risk aversion) so that, in our
view, this experiment is better interpreted as also not nding overcondence.
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self-placements. Therefore, in addition to testing for overcondence we test the hypothesis
that subjects do not have very tight estimates of their types.6 Note that in the previous
driving example, 3
5
of the driversbelieve that their mean abilities and median abilities are
better than average, justifying their overcondent seeming answers. At the same time, each
of these drivers thinks there is a 4
9
chance that he is not above average, and even a 1
9
chance
that he is below average.
Even if we grant that subjects with no material incentive respond to questionnaires as
accurately as possible, so that point 1) above is not an issue, an experiment that fails to pay
attention to any one of the remaining points may fail as a test of overplacement, as we show
in the following section.
2 Background
When should we say that a person is overcondent? An immediate proposal is that an
overcondent person is not as skillfulas she thinks she is. However, making such a deter-
mination may be problematic, as many skills are not easily measured. For instance, consider
a person who asserts I am a very good driver. Even supposing that we can make the
notion of very goodprecise and that we can agree on what constitutes a very good driver,
how are we to determine if the statement is true? Giving the person a driving test may not
be practical. Moreover, the skills measured in such a test may not match up very well with
the day-to-day skills reected in the drivers self-assessment.
Researchers have circumvented these problems by considering entire populations at once
and asking subjects how their skills compare to each other. Beyond circumvention, there are
at least two reasons to be interested in this overplacement. Firstly, in many domains people
may well have a better idea of their relative placements than their absolute placements.
Thus, we might expect students to have a better idea of their math abilities relative to their
classmates, than of their absolute abilities. Secondly, in many areas of interest, relative
ability is of primary importance. For instance, in many jobs success depends primarily on a
persons abilities relative to his or her peers.
The basic idea behind the relative population approach is that, since not more than 50%
can be in the top 50% in skill level, if more than half the people in a population claim to
be in the top half or make choices which reveal such a belief they mustbe making an
error. However, as the example in the introduction shows, this idea is awed. Obviously, it
6Within the behavioral economics literature, a number of papers, including Bénabou and Tirole (2002)
and K½oszegi (2006), start from the premise that people are continually learning about their types. Several
strands of the psychology literature also stress that people are uncertain of their types, including Festingers
(1954) inuential social comparison theory, Bems (1967) self-perception theory, and Amabile (1983).
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is important to have a proper theoretical framework for discussing overcondence.
Clearly, the implication in terming a population overcondent is that the members of
the population have made some errors or have some inconsistencies in their self-evaluations.7
Thus, B&D proposes that data be called overcondent only if it cannot be obtained from
a population which derives its beliefs in a fully rational and consistent manner. A fairly
standard model for a population deriving its beliefs in such a manner is as follows:
Denition 1 A signalling structure is a triplet  = (S;; f), where S is a set of signals,
  R is a type space, and f = ffg2 is a collection of probability distributions over S.
Denition 2 A signalling model consists of a population of individuals and a signalling
structure  = (S;; f) such that:
i) In period 0, nature picks a type  2  for each individual, resulting in some distribution
p; initially, each persons belief about her own type is given by this distribution.
ii) In period 1, an individual of type  receives a signal s 2 S according to the probability
distribution f; each person updates her initial belief using Bayesrule.
 Throughout this paper we assume that higher types are more skillful.
We say that a person of type t is in the top x of a population if the fraction of people
whose type is greater than or equal to t is at most x. Thus, in a population of 100 people at
most 25 can be in the top 1
4
.
Denition 3 Suppose that a fraction y of a population of N people believe that there is a
probability q that their type is in the top x of the population. These beliefs can be rationalized
if there is a signalling model with N individuals in which the expected fraction of people who
will have these beliefs after updating is y.
Notice that by asking that y be the expected fraction of people who will hold the particular
beliefs, the denition is demanding: Data cannot be rationalized simply because it is possible
that it could arise in a stochastic environment. If the data from an experiment can be
rationalized, there is no prima facie reason to call it overcondent.
The following Theorem, taken from B&D, provides the basis for our tests of overcon-
dence.
Theorem 1 Consider a population of N people and two integers 0  m  N and 1  r  N .
Suppose a fraction y = m
N
of the population believe that there is a probability at least q that
their types are in the top x = r
N
of the population. These beliefs can be rationalized if and
only if qy  x.
7These errors can be expected to lead to further errors, such as too many people attempting to become
professional athletes.
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The following example illustrates the Theorem. Consider ten people who are to take a
math test. First suppose that 7 of them believe that there is at least a 1
2
probability that
their type is in the top 3
10
(so that qy > x). If this belief were rational, then on average at
least 1
2
 7
10
= 7
20
of the population would be in the top 3
10
, a clear absurdity. On the other
hand, suppose instead that 3
5
of the people believe that there is at least a 1
2
probability that
their type is in the top 3
10
. How could these beliefs rationally arise? One simple way is as
follows. Before the test, a brief conversation reveals that six of them have an advanced degree
in mathematics, whereas the remaining four have only high school mathematics. With no
further information, the six can rationally believe they will place in the top six, with the
precise order being uniformly random. Hence each of the six believes there is a 1
2
chance he
or she will place in the top 30%.
Armed with Theorem 1, we are in a position to better appreciate the four criticisms of
prior experiments made in the introduction.
Consider a person who is given the choice between a 50% chance at a prize, and the prize
if she places in the top half of a subject pool on a test. The person has been incentivized
and the meaning of averageis irrelevant, so Criticism 1 and 2 do not apply. Suppose the
person strictly prefers the prize based on her test placement. The meaning of her preference
is clear she believes that there is more than a 50% chance that she places in the top half
so that Criticism 3 does not apply either. However, the strength of this belief exactly
how much more than 50%  is unclear, so that Criticism 4 does apply. Theorem 1 tells
us that almost everybody could rationally prefer the placement alternative, rendering the
experiment useless as a test for overcondence.8
Svenson (1981) nds that 82.5% of (American) subjects in his experiment claim to be
in the top 30% of subjects in their driving skill level. His subjects are not incentivized.
More importantly, even granting the veracity of their answers, the meaning of these claims is
unclear (Criticism 3). If the subjects, who presumably are uncertain of exactly how skillful
they are as drivers, are answering based upon their self-beliefs about their median type, then
Theorem 1 shows that the subjects are displaying overcondence. However, if the subjects
are answering based upon their self-beliefs about their mean type, then Theorem 4 in B&D
shows that their answers are consistent with purely rational self-assessments.9
8Even everybody (as opposed to almost everybody) strictly prefering the placement bet is consistent with
rationality, given an inevitable sampling errorarising from the nite population.
9See B&D for a detailed discussion of what happens when people base their answers on their mean beliefs.
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3 The experiment
On the positive side, Theorem 1 paves the way for experiments (in which people place them-
selves) that provide the potential of detecting overplacement. We can infer overcondence if
a su¢ cient fraction of people (variable y in the theorem) believe su¢ ciently strongly (variable
q) that they rank su¢ ciently high (variable x). We conduct two tests of overplacement. We
test if more than 60% of the subjects believe that there is at least a 50% chance that their
type is in the top 30%. Recall that Svenson found that over 80% of his American subjects
placed themselves in the top 30%, but it was unclear what they meant by this placement. We
also test if more than 83.3 % of the subjects feel that there is more than a 60% chance that
they are better than the median. We choose 60% because we are independently interested in
whether a relatively small increase in the chance of receiving a prize randomly from 50%
in a benchmark test to 60% here makes many people change their choice behavior. While
these are the explicit tests we conduct, as discussed below implicitly there are more tests.
We were interested in the extent to which previous ndings of apparent overplacement
could be shown to be actual overplacement. Prior experimental work and the theory in B&D
demonstrate that populations exhibit the better-than-average e¤ect more markedly on easy
tasks than di¢ cult ones.10 Accordingly, we gave our subjects an easy test.
Subjects were 134 individuals recruited through the web site of the Center for Behavioral
Decision Research at Carnegie Mellon University<http://cbdr.cmu.edu/experiments/>. We
report the data for the 129 subjects who gave complete responses to the three choices with
which they were presented; the results are unchanged when we analyze, for each question,
all the answers we have for that question.
The experiment was advertised under the name Test yourselfalong with the following
description: Participants in this study will take a test with logic and math puzzles. How
much money people make depends on their performance and on how they choose to bet on
that performance.This wording of the recruitment instructions was chosen to be conductive
to more overcondent looking data (Camerer and Lovallo (1999) nd that excess entry
into their game (their measure of overcondence) is much larger when subjects volunteer to
participate in the experiment knowing that payo¤s will depend on skill).
Subjects had a mean age of 25 years (SD = 6.4) and 42 percent of them were male.
All subjects took a 20-item quiz of math and logic puzzles. They made a series of three
choices between (1) bets on their test performance (skill) and (2) chance gambles of known
probability. Subjects had to choose one of the two for each of the three pairs of bets. The
three pairs of bets are listed below.
10The theory in Moore and Healy (2008) predicts that a test that is easier than expected should yield more
overcondent looking data.
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Skill Option
1. You will receive $10 if your test score
puts you in the top half of previous test-
takers. In other words, if your score is better
than at least 50% of other test-takers, you
will get $10.
.
.
2. You will receive $10 if your test score
puts you in the top 30% of previous test-
takers. In other words, if your score is better
than at least 70% of other test takers, you
will get $10.
.
.
3. You will receive $10 if your test score
puts you in the top half of previous test-
takers. In other words, if your score is better
than at least 50% of other test takers, you
will get $10
.
.
Chance Option
1. There is a 50% chance you will receive
$10. We have a bag with 5 blue poker chips
and 5 red poker chips. You will reach in to
the bag without looking and randomly select
one of the poker chips. If the poker chip is
blue, then you will get $10. If it is red, you
will get nothing
2. There is a 50% chance you will receive
$10. We have a bag with 5 blue poker chips
and 5 red poker chips. You will reach in to
the bag without looking and randomly select
one of the poker chips. If the poker chip is
blue, then you will get $10. If it is red, you
will get nothing.
3. There is a 60% chance you will receive
$10. We have a bag with 6 blue poker chips
and 4 red poker chips. You will reach in to
the bag without looking and randomly select
one of the poker chips. If the poker chip is
blue, then you will get $10. If it is red, you
will get nothing.
Subjects were randomly assigned to experimental conditions that crossed two treatment
variables: motivation and feedback.
The motivation manipulation varied what subjects were told about the test they were
about to take. By introducing a manipulation of motivation we hoped to observe the e¤ect
of inducing a motive to be overcondent. Many theories of overcondence assume that the
belief that one is better than others is driven by the desire to actually be better than others
(Benabou & Tirole, 2002; Köszegi, 2006; Kunda, 1990). Therefore, peoples propensity to
overplace their performances relative to those of others ought to be greatest under those
circumstances when they are most motivated to achieve (see Krizan & Windschitl, 2007).
Those in the high motivation condition read:
In this experiment, you will be taking an intelligence test. Intelligence, as you know, is
an important dimension on which people di¤er. There are many positive things associated
with higher intelligence, including the fact that more intelligent people are more likely to
get better grades and advance farther in their schooling. It may not be surprising to you
that more intelligent people also tend to earn more money professionally. Indeed, according
9
to research by Beaton (1975) ten IQ points are worth about four thousand dollars in annual
salary. Childrens intelligence is a good predictor of their future economic success according
to Herrnstein and Murray (1994). Of course, this is partly because, as documented in
research by Lord, DeVader, and Alliger (1986) intelligent people are perceived to have greater
leadership potential and are given greater professional opportunities. But what may be
surprising to you is that intelligent people also tend to have signicantly better health and
longer life expectancies (see research by Gottfredson & Deary, 2004).
Those in the low motivation condition read: In this experiment, you will be taking a
test of math and logic puzzles.
Then subjects saw a set of sample test items. In order to constitute this set of sample
items, we began with a larger set of 40 test items. One half of this set was randomly chosen
for Test Set S. The other half belonged to Test Set M. Those participants who were to take
Test S saw sample items from Set M, and vice versa.
Half of the subjects (those in the feedback condition) received a histogram showing how
others had scored on the test they were about to take.
Next, subjects chose between skill and chance options for each of the three bets. The
order in which the three bets appeared was varied randomly, as was whether the chance or
the skill option appeared rst for each bet. Participants were told that they would make the
three choices again after taking the test, and that one of these six choices would be randomly
selected at the end of the experiment to count for actual payo¤s.
Then subjects took the twenty-item test under a ten-minute time limit. The two test sets
appear in Appendix A. Subjects earned $.25 for each test question they answered correctly.
Then subjects chose between the skill and chance options for each of the three bets again.
Subjects then answered a series of questions regarding what they thought their score would
be, how they felt during the experiment, etc.
Finally, if a subject chose to bet on chance (rather than their test performance) for the
one bet that counted, an experimenter had the subject draw from the relevant bag of poker
chips to determine whether he or she won the $10 prize.
4 The data
Before taking the test, each subject was presented with the three previously listed groups
of choices. The order in which subjects were presented with these choices was randomized
among subjects. The choices can be summarized as:
1. Benchmark Choice: A 50% chance of a prize (as determined by a random draw), or
to be awarded the prize if your score on the test places you in the top 50% of previous
test takers.
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2. High Placement Choice: A 50% chance of a prize (as determined by a random
draw), or to be awarded the prize if your score on the test places you in the top 30%
of previous test takers.
3. Strength Choice: A 60% chance of a prize (as determined by a random draw), or to
be awarded the prize if your score on the test places you in the top 50% of previous
test takers.
There are 5 variables, none of which had any e¤ect on the choice behavior of subjects (or
their scores except for the High Motivation treatment, which decreased scores, see below).
First, as expected, neither of the following three randomizations had any e¤ect:
 The order of the presentation of the bets (123, 132, 213, etc).
 Whether the skill or random bet was presented rst in each pair.
 Whether subjects saw sample M and took test S, or saw S and took M.
Second, we didnt have a prior belief of how the feedback manipulation would a¤ect
scores or choices between bets; it had no e¤ect. Finally, and surprisingly to us, the Moti-
vation manipulation had no e¤ect either. Hence, we discuss only aggregate data, without
discriminating by treatments.
Of paramount importance to a subject is her score on the test. Thus, it is most convenient
to model a subjects typeas just being this score.11 This means that at the time she makes
her decision, the subject does not yet have a type. Rather, her type is a random variable
to be determined later. Formally, this poses no di¢ culties. Based on her life experiences
and the sample test she sees, the subject has a distribution over her possible types, i.e., test
scores. In the Benchmark Choice, a subject (presumably) prefers to be rewarded based on
her placement if there is more than a 50% chance her type is in the top 50%. In the High
Placement Choice, a subject prefers to be rewarded based on her placement if there is more
than a 50% chance her type is in the top 30%. In the Strength Choice, a subject prefers to
be rewarded based on her placement if there is more than a 60% chance that her type is in
the top 50%.
As expected, in the Benchmark Choice, the population displays apparent overplacement:
74% choose to be rewarded based upon their placement. Barring too many equally skilled
subjects (and ignoring the possibility of errors), such a result is usually interpreted as 74%
place themselves in the top half of test takers. However, this statement is imprecise, if
not misleading. A more precise interpretation is that 74% believe that there is at least a
11Other ways to model the subjects type are possible, however.
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50% chance that they are in the top half (or more than 50% chance if we interpret their
preferences as being strict).
Note that these two interpretations are di¤erent and have di¤erent implications for ratio-
nality. In the rst interpretation, if we assume place themselvesindicates (near) certainty,
then the population displays overcondence, not just apparent overcondence. But the more
precise interpretation, the second interpretation, shows that the choice behavior of the sub-
jects is consistent with rationality, as indicated by Theorem 1. Overplacement can be inferred
only if the subjectsbelief that they are in the top half is su¢ ciently more than 50% or if
they believe they place su¢ ciently high within the top half.
Before turning to the question of overplacement, we consider the question of how certain
a subject is of her type. Of the 74% who opt for placing in the top half over a 50% random
draw, 22% switch and choose a 60% random draw over placing in the top half.12 Thus, a
signicant fraction of the subjects do not show much condence in their belief that they are
better than average. This fact supports the underlying premise of B&D (2008), and of Moore
and Healy (2008), that people are uncertain of their types.13 In particular, it suggests that
prior work on overcondence cannot be justied by an untested presumption that people
are certain, or nearly certain, of their types. Presumably, if we had asked people to vote for
their placement versus a 70% or higher random draw we would have found even more people
defecting from the placement option.
We turn now to the question of overcondence. As noted, Theorem 1 proves that the
Benchmark Choice cannot show overcondence, since every subject could prefer the place-
ment option even in a rational population. However, the Strength Choice and High Place-
ment Choice do have the potential to show overcondence.
From Theorem 1, the population exhibits overcondence if more than 60% vote for the
skill bet in the High Placement pair of bets (i.e. place in the top 30% vs $10 with 50%
chance), or if more than 83.3% vote for the skill bet in the Strength pair of bets (i.e. place in
the top half vs. get $10 with 60% chance). In fact, only 51.9% and not 60% vote for the skill
bet in the High Placement pair of bets (51.9% is di¤erent from 60% at the 3% signicance
level). Also, only 64.3% and not 83.3% choose the skill bet in the Strength pair (64.3% is
di¤erent from 83.3% at signicance levels lower than 1%).
Observe that Theorem 1 shows that 64.3% of the population could rationally prefer to
be paid based on placing in the top half to receiving the prize randomly with a probability
of up to 77.8%. Thus, assuming that the number of people who bet on their placement
12We note that 6% of the subjects favor a 50% draw over their placement, but their placement over a 60%
draw. We have no explanation for this inconsistent behaviour.
13However, our experiement does not provide a denitive test of the subjects uncertainty about their
types as they may also have been concerned about randomness in the test itself (although concern about
this randomdess should be mitigated because subjects were shown a quite representative sample test).
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would not increase as the probability of receiving the prize increases (in the random bet),
we cannot reject the no-overcondence hypothesis for a range of prize probabilities beyond
the 60% we test for directly. We note that, on the one hand, the gure 77.8% overstates
the range as it accepts the 64.3% of the population as a precise count without conducting
a signicance test, while on the other hand it understates the range as, surely, far less than
64% of the population would have voted for the test had the alternative been the prize with
a probability of 78% or greater.
Although it is not the focus of our study, we mention one intriguing nding. While
the high/low motivation treatment does not a¤ect the betting behaviour of our subjects,
the subjects have signicantly lower scores under the high motivation treatment. Those in
the high motivation condition answered 16.6 questions correctly, whereas those in the low
motivation condition answered an average of 18 questions correctly, and an independent
samples t-test reveals this di¤erence to be signicant at signicance levels below 1%. Thus,
our subjects appear to chokeunder pressure, as has been documented by other studies,
including Ariely, Gneezy, Loewenstein, and Mazar (2005), Beilock and Carr (2001), Dohmen
(2005), and Markman and Maddox (2006). In the present context, this nding is interesting
in that it speaks to the potential adaptiveness (or lack thereof) of motivations to be condent.
4.1 A Single Model
Theorem 1 indicates that the results from our three questions can all be generated in a
rational fashion. More precisely, the theorem tells us that the data from these three choices
can be rationalized by three di¤erent rational models (three populations, three signalling
structures, etc). However, our data comes from a single subject pool in a single experiment.
We now show by construction that the aggregate data can also rationally be generated by a
single experiment in which all the participants are fully rational.
There are twenty-one possible scores in our experiment, and so we build a model with
twenty-one types. Subjects receive signals of their types. Given the nature of the experiment,
the simplest model to generate the data is one in which the population divides into three
equivalence classes. Types in the lowest equivalence class, l, score in the bottom 50% of
subjects; types in the middle equivalence class, m, score in-between the bottom 50% and
the top 30% of subjects; types in the highest class score in the top 30%. Each type in a given
equivalence class receives one of fours signals s1; s2; s3; s4 according to the same probability
distribution. The joint probability distribution of types and signals is
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l m h Marginal
s1 :2599081 :000087 0000049 26%
s2 :0499 :0393 :0108 10%
s3 :051987 :043823 :03419 13%
s4 :1382049 :11679 :2550051 51%
Marginal 1
2
1
5
3
10
The numbers in the above chart are not particularly niceas they must be chosen to
t the data. Importantly, however, the signalling structure itself is nice in that it satis-
es the monotone likelihood ratio property (for type 0 larger than type ; we have that
Pr0 (si) =Pr (si) is increasing in si).
The following table shows the posterior beliefs over types given each signal sj, Pr (ijsj),
l m h
s1 0:99965 :00033462 :000018846
s2 0:499 0:393 0:108
s3 0:399 9 0:337 1 0:263
s4 0:270 99 0:229 0:50001
Thus, a person who sees the signal, say, s4, believes she has just above a 27% chance of
placing in the bottom 50%, just below a 23% chance of placing higher than the bottom 50%
but lower than the top 30%, and just above a 50% of placing in the top 50%. Such a person
will always vote for the placement option rather than one of the random choices, since there
is a 73% chance that she places in the top 50% and over a 50% chance that she places in the
top 30%. The following table indicates how people who receive the di¤erent signals should
vote:
Pr top half vs 50% top 30% vs 50% top half vs 60%
s1 26% Random Random Random
s2 10% Placement Random Random
s3 13% Placement Random Placement
s4 51% Placement Placement Placement
Placement Total 74% 51% 64%
As the bottom row of the table shows, this signalling model generates the data found in our
experiment.
5 Conclusion
As in much previous experimental work, we nd a better-than-average e¤ect among our
subjects. Since the task we assigned the subjects was an easy one, the theory in B&D
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led us to expect this nding. In contrast to previous work, we inquire further to see if the
subjects exhibit behaviour that cannot be explained rationally but, rather, is unambiguously
indicative of biased and erroneous beliefs. We do not nd such evidence, even though we
pushed in the direction of overcondence by recruiting subjects through instructions that
would lead to self selection and by motivating them. We also test whether subjects are
uncertain of their types and nd evidence that they are quite unsure. This is important
because previous work on the better-than-average e¤ect could be interpreted as showing
overcondence if subjects are (almost) certain of their types. In contrast to previous work
(Moore and Healy (2008), Clark and Friesen, 2008) that has also failed to nd overplacement,
while conducting a proper test, our experiment is based on subjectsestimations just of their
relative rankings.14
Our experiment can be viewed as a test of the null hypothesis that people are behaving
rationally (at least in so far as they are not overcondent). We cannot reject that hypothesis.
Of course, this is not to say that we can rule out the hypothesis that people are overcondent,
either. One reason is that we did not (and could not) carry out all the tests implied by
Theorem 1. Therefore, for instance, we do not know how many people would have been
willing to bet that they would place in the top 20% of test takers. Another reason is that,
by their very design, these types of experiments are ill-suited to rule out overcondent,
or undercondent, behaviour. To understand this claim, suppose that ten subjects are to
be given a Japanese vocabulary test and that nine of them have absolutely no knowledge
of Japanese, while the tenth is Japanese. The nine subjects, who will answer questions
randomly, each have about a 4
9
chance of nishing in the top half while the Japanese subject
will almost certainly nish in the top half. If the subjects are behaving rationally, only 10%
of the people should prefer betting that they place in the top half rather than accepting a
50% chance at a prize. Therefore, if 30% vote for the placement option, the subjects, as a
whole, are overcondent even though they naively appear to be undercondent. We used our
experimental design, despite its inability to rule out overcondence, because there is a vast
literature with experiments of this type purporting to show overcondence, and we wanted
to see if, in fact, overcondence could be found here. Naturally, a priori it seemed quite
possible that we would nd overcondence.
The di¢ culty with making strong conclusions about whether people are overcondent
given their limited information and imperfect signals is that we cannot observe all their
information or their private signals, which include events from their lifetime experience.
14The literature on better-than-average experiments can be divided into two types: Ranking Experiments,
such at the one in this paper (and myriad others), where subjects indicate their beliefs just about their
relative placement, and Scale Experiments where subjects indicate exactly where they place on a scale. The
experiments by Clark and Friesen (2008) and Moore and Healy (2008) are implicitly Scale Experiments.
B&D contains a detailed discussion.
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Thus, we do not know what rational Bayesian agents would believe had they known what
our subjects knew after they saw the practice test. We make no claims, however, that our
subjects are rational Bayesians. Many researchers have argued that BayesRule is not a good
description of intuitive human judgment (Kahneman & Tversky,(1972), Grether, 1980). At
the same time, there is evidence that their judgments nevertheless roughly follow the logic
underlying BayesRule: their posterior beliefs lie somewhere between their priors and the
signal they receive (Grether (1990), McKelvey & Page (1990).
We do not purport to show that there are no circumstances under which people believe
irrationally in their own superiority. No study can do that. Our study questions the general-
ity of the conclusion that people have biased beliefs that they are better than others. It may
be argued that the experimental design we have chosen, in which performance can be mea-
sured unambiguously, and our subjects expected that their claims about performance would
therefore be subject to verication, may undermine subjectswillingness to indulge their
motivation to believe that they are better than others (Dunning, Meyerowitz, & Holzberg,
1989). We can only respond that such objective measurement is necessary in order to assess
the accuracy of subjectsbeliefs.
Some have noted the potential adaptive benets of beliefs in ones own superiority (Ar-
mor, Massey, & Sackett, in press; Benabou & Tirole, 2002). If self-condence increases the
probability of success, then even a belief that may be demonstrably inaccurate could nev-
ertheless be rational in the larger sense. Nevertheless, any such claim must contend with
evidence suggesting that belief in ones own superiority can undermine subsequent perfor-
mance, such as when a students assurance that he will perform well on a test leads him
to not study (Stone, 1994), when motivation to perform leads to choking under pressure
(Ariely, Gneezy, Loewenstein, & Mazar, 2005; Beilock & Carr, 2001; Dohmen, 2005; Mark-
man & Maddox, 2006), or when inated belief in ones social status reduces ones popularity
(Anderson, Srivastava, Beer, Spataro, & Chatman, 2006). Moreover, there is the disap-
pointment that is likely to follow inated expectations of performance (McGraw, Mellers, &
Ritov, 2004).
It is not fair to assume that people are omniscient or perfectly prescient. Theories of
human behavior must take into account the limited, imperfect, and biased information people
have at their disposal when they make important assessments, such as their abilities relative
to others. Our psychological and economic theories will be better to the extent that they do
so.
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6 Appendix A: Test items from the two tests
1S) Susie has a cake that she splits into six pieces to share with all her friends. If each person
with a piece of cake then splits their piece in half to give to another friend, how many pieces
of cake are there in the end? 12
1M) The Maroons are rst in the league and the Browns are fth while the Blues are
between them. If the Grays have more points than the Violets and the Violets are exactly
below the Blues then who is second? The Grays
2S) A bridge consists of 10 sections; each section is 2.5 meters long. How far is it from
the edge of the bridge to the center? 12.5 m
2M) Five friends share three oranges equally. Each orange contains ten wedges. How
many wedges does each friend receive? 6
3S) There are four equally spaced beads on a circle. How many straight lines are needed
to connect each bead with every other bead? 6
3M) Fall is to Summer as Monday is to _____? Sunday
4S) HAND is to Glove as HEAD is to _____? Hat
4M) What is the minimum number of toothpicks necessary to spell the word "HAT".
(You are not allowed to break or bend any toothpicks, or use one toothpick as a part of more
than one letter.) 8
5S) John needs 13 bottles of water from the store. John can only carry 3 at a time.
Whats the minimum number of trips John needs to make to the store? 5
5M) Milk is to glass as soup is to _____? bowl
6S) LIVED is to DEVIL as 6323 is to _____? 3236
6M) Which number should be next in the sequence: 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, ? 64
7S) If the day before yesterday is two days after Monday then what day is it today?
Friday
7M) A rancher is building an open-ended (straight) fence by stringing wire between posts
25 meters apart. If the fence is 100 meters long how many posts should the rancher use?
5
8S) Which number should come next in the series: 3, 9, 6, 12, 9, 15, 12, 18, ? 15
8M) Meowis to a cat as Moois to _____? Cow
9S) Which letter logically follows in this sequence: T, Q, N, K, H, ? E
9M) Which word does not belong in the group with the other words? Brown, Black,
Broom, Orange, Bread Orange
10S) If two typists can type two pages in ve minutes, how many typists will it take to
type twenty pages in ten minutes? 10
10M) If a woman is 21 and is half the age of her mom, how old will the mom be when
the woman is 42? 63
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11S) Tiger is to stripes as leopard is to _____? Spots
11M) Which number should come next: 514, 64, 8, 1, 1/8, ? 1/64
12S) Brother is to sister as nephew is to _____? Niece
12M) Which number should come next in this series: 1 - 1 - 2 - 3 - 5 - 8 - 13 - ? 21
13S) Desert is to oasis as ocean is to _____? Island
13M) If 10 missionaries have 3 children each, but only two thirds of the children survive,
how many children survive? 20
14S) Kara has $100. She decides to put 20% in savings, donate 20% to a charity, spend
40% on bills, and use 20% for a shopping spree. How much money does she have left over
afterwards? $0
14M) Kimberly makes $20 per hour and works for 20 hours each week. How much does
she make in a week? 400
15S) How many straight lines are needed to divide a regular hexagon into 6 identical
triangles? 3
15M) Which number should come next in this series: 1,4,9,16,25,? 36
16S) What is the average of 12, 6 and 9? 9
16M) DIDIIDID is to 49499494 as DIIDIIDD is to _____? 49949944
17S) There are three 600 ml water bottles. Two are full, the third is 2/3rds full. How
much water is there total? 1600ml
17M) If a wood pile contains 30 kilos of wood and 15.5 kilos are burned, how many kilos
are left? 14.5
18S) Which letter does not belong in the following series: D - F - H - J - K - N - P - R
K
18M) Joe was both 5th highest and 5th lowest in a race. How many people participated?
9
19S) If a certain type of bug lives for only 20 days, how old is the bug when it has lived
half of its lifespan? 10 days
19M) PEACH is to HCAEP as 46251 is to _____? 15264
20S) Begin is to began as ght is to _____? Fought
20M) Nurse is to hospital as teacher is to _____? school
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